[Column] North¡¯s negotiating style is thorny

With the inter-Korean Joint Declaration exactly 16 weeks old today, certain characteristics of the inter-Korean talks and relationships have become clearer.

First, although there has been a flurry of talks in various dimensions that resulted in some rather visible results, the truth of the matter is that they truly were not major advancements. We have become quite used to the important pending issues being postponed to the second round during the first round, then to the third round during the second.

Would it be stretching the point to remind ourselves of the words in the foreign textbooks that state that the negotiations "dance" but do not lead anywhere, in connection to the various "balls" held by the European countries for negotiations by various nations in 1815 to bring order once again to Europe following the Napoleonic Wars? All in all, there have been many media blitzes and much rhetoric, but the true fruits of the Joint Declaration have been lacking.

Second, North`s Korea`s request for economic cooperation and aid has been expanding, and the scale in cost also has been increasing. Although it was predictable, at every request by the North for fertilizer, food and energy, it only raises the questions: Could South Korea truly manage such aid to the North? Is there a limit to their requests?

Whether in terms of humanitarianism or in the light of the fact that we are the one and same people, and as South Korea`s aid would bring greater improvements and peace, it goes without saying that the South should help the North. As such, the South cannot escape the necessary sacrifices. However, a line must be drawn.

Third, leaving the issue of the North aside, South Korea retains a degree of non-transparency in its adoption and implementation of governmental policies. Of course, there is a need for a certain degree of secrecy. However, according to the reports, the South`s head delegate for the inter-Korean ministerial talks, the Minister of Unification expressed discontent at being kept in the dark, saying, "This is not right." The people of Korea have no idea what the North has requested on what basis, or what the South has answered and what the South has agreed to give, or what more the South must give.

Through what has been exposed to the general public, which has not been tainted by party politics, has become increasingly critical. The earlier excitement and hope have been turning into derision and criticism. Even those who praised the government during many surveys have turned and begun to criticize the government. For the long-term inter-Korean relationship, an obstacle has been growing.

In such scenario, we must look closely at the two decisions made by the North.

First, Cho Myong-Rok, first vice chairman of the National Defense Commission and the second man in the North`s power hierarchy, is currently in the United States. Improvement of ties with Washington is crucial to North Korea. For Washington, the shelving of the North`s missile development and coming to terms with the leadership in such matters as the U.S. presence on the peninsula are crucial, as well. If a bilateral understanding could be reached by North Korean officials considered second or third in the North`s power structure and the United States for a breakthrough in the improving ties between the two states, it would be most fortuitous.

On the other hand, a question arises whether the North is trying to sideline South Korea as its negotiates with the United States directly for a peace accord including the issues of military presence on the peninsula, peace and safety. This might well be, as the inter-Korean Joint Declaration markedly lacks any mention of military presence and peace as well as safety.

Second, the North has invited various individuals in the South to the North`s Workers` Party Festival. If the inter-Korean relationship had improved to a great degree, officials to come and go through visits to celebrate such grand occasions are expected. However, the Workers` Party Festival for October of this month is too early, and the method of invitation lacked sincerity. Furthermore, it might aggravate the hidden dissatisfaction toward the North, which has yet to become visible.

On the whole, what the North has shown in its handling of the inter-Korean relationship is that it has continually driven its dialogue partner, the South Korean government, into a difficult corner. If the North truly desires an inter-Korean dialogue, it must avoid any development that would injure the inter-Korean peace policy of the South. The North must realize that the agreement and satisfaction of the South Korean people are just as important as the will of the government.

Should the North adopt a posture that would cause the opinions of the Korean people to turn against the government and its North Korean policy, it would prove detrimental to the North.