Posted November. 06, 2000 14:24,
Although the three-day missile talks that began Nov. 1 were held between North Korea and the United States in Kuala Lumpur, where both parties discussed in detail their positions, a final agreement has not been reached.
Prior to the talks the two parties declared a joint communiqué Oct. 12 hoping for the resolution of the missile issue to serve as the foundation for the reconciliation between the North and the United States, as well as contribute to the Asian regional peace and stability.
The United States views the missile agreement as the pivotal issue that could pave the way toward improved relationship.
Accordingly, the lack of agreement in the missile talks has put the proposed visit by President Bill Clinton to North Korea in mid-November on hold. Without doubt, the agreement in the missile issue lies at the heart of the final decision for Clinton's visit to the North, as well as the long-term direction and degree of reconciliation between the two states.
To better grasp the direction of the resolution of the missile crisis, it would be necessary to review the 1994 Geneva Accord that was reached to resolve the North's nuclear arms crisis.
During the talks for the nuclear arms curtailment, the North revealed its integrity to three principles.
The North first distinguished the difference in the military and peaceful application of nuclear development, then sought financial aid for the construction of peaceful nuclear development facilities such as light-water reactors and power facilities in lieu of shelving the nuclear development for military use.
At the same time, the North sought political and economic normalization with the United States while seeking joint effort toward the non-nuclear proliferation, peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.
Lastly, the North during the negotiations attempted to distinguish and separate its various militaristic programs and facilities to maximize its stance against United States call to close down such facilities.
The North largely has followed for the missile talks the three principles shown during the nuclear arms talks. The North distinguished the difference in the military and peaceful aspects, and in lieu of shelving the long-range ballistic missile development program and test launches, is seeking assistance for artificial satellite launches.
Furthermore, in lieu of ban on export of the mid-range ballistic missiles, the North has requested monetary compensation. In addition, the North is seeking a greater political and economic normalization with the United States than agreed to during the talks in Geneva, and has further requested the establishment of peace guarantee with the United States.
As such, the North once again has distinguished and separated its various military programs such as missile development, the test launch and the mid-range missile export in order to maximize the compensation request.
As was the case for the nuclear arms agreement, the missile agreement might necessitate long and arduous rounds of talks. For South Korea during these rounds of talks, the important issue that needs close observation is the establishment of peace agreement with the United States sought by North Korea.
The North has requested the adoption of the 1996 provisional agreement with the United States and in order for a maintained peace arising out of the armistice that alleviate the threat of armed conflicts and war. In order to do so, the North has further called for the establishment of jointly managed Joint Military Organization in place of the Military Armistice Commission.
On the other hand, since the South-North fundamental mutual agreement reached in 1991, South Korea has been calling for a peace treaty with the South and the North as main constituents, the joint management of the South-North Joint Military Commission and the international guarantee of peace from the regional superpowers including the United States and China.
Accordingly, the "North's dual agreement" (with the dominant accord between the North and the United States and a subsidiary accord between the South and the North) and the "South's dual agreement" (with the dominant accord between the South and the North and a sub-accord between United States and China) might pose a dilemma for the United States during the continuing missile talks and might decide on the very future of the peninsula. As such, the South Korean government must not let down its guard in continued promotion of diplomacy for the establishment of peace in the peninsula.
The next important fact to note is the compensation requested by the North for the discontinuation of the missile development, the missile test launch and the ban on exports. Currently, the United States is considering the artificial satellite launch assistance as compensation for shelving the long-range missile development and the test launch. However, concerning the monetary compensation requested by the North for the ban on export of mid-range missiles, a gap has been formed with the United States offering indirect compensation through such loans and aids by the international economic organizations.
However, a more productive measure for the peace and prosperity of the peninsula and the East Asian region would be, rather than the satellite launch assistance and monetary compensation, the establishment of an international consortium such as a Peninsula Information and Technology Research Institute, which could promote the peaceful application of the latest technologies.
Professor Ha Young-Sun, International Political Science Dept., Seoul National University