[Editorial] What Have the NIS and the NSC Been Doing?

With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) becoming the target of popular censure regarding the murder of Kim Sun-il, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) is embarking on a serious investigation. The BAI is not only planning to investigate the MOFAT, but also to conduct an overall inspection of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Defense Ministry. Considering the seriousness of the situation, and the stark light it sheds on the incompetence and irresponsibility of our nation’s diplomatic and security agencies, it seems only right that a “third-party” agency should be the instrument in determining where the blame truly lies.

The people’s immediate interest is most likely to be the MOFAT’s reaction to the Kim Sun-il abduction, including the suspicions surrounding the Associated Press’ report. However, a comprehensive look into what roles the other diplomacy- and security-related agencies played in this crisis, as well as into how smoothly inter-agency cooperation and the counter-terrorist network functioned in coping with it, is imperative if we are to avoid a second or a third Kim Sun-il. The investigation should not stop at merely shirking the blame onto the MOFAT.

In the NIS’ case, it is unclear exactly what role it was playing after Kim’s abduction became known, let alone during the preceding three weeks he spent in captivity. The NIS even made the mistake of pointing to the same organization that had perpetrated the April abduction of Japanese nationals as the culprits behind the Kim Sun-il abduction. Can the NIS really call itself the mainstay of the Korean counter-terrorist network after this? The repeated promise to beef up its foreign intelligence function, which the government has been offering since the previous administration, appears to have been mere empty cant.

If the NSC had properly performed its regulatory function between the various agencies, the government might not have ended up in such disarray; in this respect, the NSC bears much of the responsibility as well. The fact that President Roh had been receiving optimistic reports from the Foreign Ministry at the very moment of Kim’s murder is a striking example of the serious flaw in the NSC’s ability to assess security situations.

I believe that the tragic slaying of Kim Sun-il has generated a consensus that Korea’s existing diplomatic-security line must not be left in its present state. The BAI should thoroughly investigate all agencies involved to prepare the groundwork for an intensive overhaul. If necessary, even the National Assembly should join in the investigation effort. We cannot call ourselves a proper nation with a diplomatic-security complex that is full of holes—particularly since terrorism has now been brought right to our own doorstep.