Kessler’s Book “The Confidante” Relates Secret Stories about Rice and Hill

Invisible Efforts of Hill –

Back in 2005, Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill tried to visit Pyongyang. The conservative politicians in Washington, however, did not let it happen. To appease the opposition, Hill conjured up a solution of a joint visit with Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. special envoy for human rights in North Korea, since Lefkowitz commanded the support of neocon groups.

Secretary Condoleezza Rice and Hill discussed the possibility in March 2005. Secretary Rice reportedly said to the extent that the secluded regime of Kim Jong Il would not allow it without any compensation.

Until July 2005, no U.S. diplomat had ever met with a North Korean diplomat in a private environment. Then, Hill broke the spell. He met senior North Korean diplomat Kim Gye Gwan for almost three hours in Beijing. A senior Chinese official originally invited them to a dinner, and they returned the favor with the unprecedented meeting.

Early that morning, Hill received a message from his North Korean counterpart that he would not attend, should a Chinese diplomat join them. It sounded absurd to exclude the host from the meeting. But Hill did not report to Rice, and the Chinese diplomat kept himself out of the dinner.

Getting to know the circumstances later, Secretary Rice reportedly raised her eyebrows. Hill, however, did not come back empty-handed. He delivered North Korea’s promise to resume participation in the six-party talks. At that time, South Korean senior officials did not comment on who first asked for the invitation.

Washington Post diplomacy reporter Glenn Kessler relates in his book `The Confidante` that it was Christopher Hill who made the proposal.

Meeting her Chinese partner, Rice asked why China backed away. The Chinese foreign minister reportedly told her, “What really matters is not how they met, but what the meeting will bring about.”

The book also sheds a light on the undisclosed aspects of Hill’s behavior. Hill is said to like talking to reporters and having things done in his favor. He reportedly has learned a lot from former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, who has an excellent command of how to treat the press. Some criticized Hill for his excessive attention to the press while negotiating.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Poland Hill pulled strings to move over to South Korea, says Kessler. But Kessler fails to name the politicians Hill contacted.

Chinese Support for North Korea –

Overall, China has kept its distance from the North Korean nuclear issue. When Hill asked the Chinese government to shut off its fuel supply to Pyongyang, Beijing came up with an evasive answer: discontinuation might cause a rupture of the pipeline to the North.

Secretary Rice defined North Korea as an outpost of tyranny during her January 2005 confirmation hearing. In turn, reporter Kessler defines her act as foolish. Right after her comment, a Chinese official demanded that she cancel the remark.

Issue of Supernotes –

Secretary Rice met with the Chinese leader Hu Jintao twice in 2005. She reportedly stressed the obligation of the Bush administration to stop North Korea’s counterfeiting. Understanding the seriousness of the matter, the Chinese leader shared the view. But pressure from Washington had been expected well before the matter surfaced in August when the U.S. Treasury Department busted Taiwanese gangs in California and New Jersey that were engaged in smuggling Pyongyang-made $100 counterfeit bills.

Whenever encountering Korean reporters, Hill denied his knowledge of Banco Delta Asia, a bank in Macau, and related matters. Kessler, however, disputes Hill’s denial, and writes in his book that the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments had already informed the State Department how and why the bank played a key role in the supernote smuggling.

Bush’s Ideas on Regional Peace–

Last November, meeting his South Korean counterpart in Vietnam, U.S. President Bush hinted that the United States government might cut a peace deal with the Kim Jong Il regime. President Bush, however, made his first official comment on the idea during his luncheon meeting with Hu Jintao. Chinese President Hu Jintao promised full cooperation on the spot, including sending a special envoy to Pyongyang. Despite the efforts, the secluded regime test-fired missiles in July and conducted a nuclear test in October.

Rigid Stance of Bush Administration –

During the talks, which led to the 9/19 pact, the Bush administration would not ease its position, and earned heavy opposition from Beijing.

When the delegations from the six countries got finally relaxed after reaching an agreement, Secretary Rice called up Hill over the phone. Rice wanted to change the phrase “peaceful coexistence” in the agreement. She believed that the conservative politicians in Washington might interpret the phrase as recognition of the Kim Jong Il regime. Hill asked China to make some modification, but China brushed it off, defining the request as ridiculous.

In the end, the Bush administration changed it to “exist peacefully together,” while the other countries did not make such a change.

srkim@donga.com