[Wakamiya’s Review from Tokyo] Is Japan heading toward constitutional revision under 'law of following year?'

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been frequently mentioning a constitutional revision since the beginning of this year. He even said that he wanted to achieve a revision during his term in office. Although a constitutional revision has been his long desire, why has he made this an urgent task?

My thoughts stopped at the agreement on the comfort women issue that South Korea and Japan announced late last year. Having made a big concession on his position, Abe brings up the issue of a constitutional revision at the beginning of the New Year. Did he have the "principle of the following year" in mind?

As the "principle of the following year" is nothing but a term that I coined on the basis of my observations, Abe would have no idea what that means. From 50 years ago, whenever Japan made a breakthrough in reconciliation with South Korea or China, Tokyo made laws corresponding to nationalism in the following year. By "principle," I mean that it has been repeated.

The first case is the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which normalized diplomatic relations between the two neighbors. The signing of the treaty culminated with the Japanese foreign minister visiting Seoul to express Japan's atonement and apologies for the past. In February in the following year, Japan made a law designating February 11 as the National Foundation Day. In the past, Japan celebrated the day called "Kigensetsu" based on Emperor Jimmu's ascension to throne as the country's very first emperor. The celebration was abolished after World War II. However, Tokyo re-designated the new holiday in response to the conservatives' demand for the revival.

After the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China was signed in 1978, Tokyo enacted the Era Name Law with a purpose of institutionalizing Japan's traditional era names such as Meiji and Showa to officially maintain them.

Similar cases are found in the 1980s, too. When President Chun Doo-hwan became the first South Korean leader to make a state visit to Japan in 1984, Emperor Showa expressed "regrets" over the past for the first time. It was the then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone who invited Chun. On August 15, 1985, Nakasone paid an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine to meet the right-wing forces' expectations. He stopped the visit from the following year due to a strong protest from China. Even in doing so, he swung between reconciliation and nationalism.

In the 1990s, successive Japanese prime minister offered apologies for their country's aggression and colonial rules in Asia. They culminated in the 1988 Joint Declaration on a New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. The latter apologized for Jaapn's colonial rule of Korea, while Kim responded with reconciliation. In the same year, Chinese President Zhang Zemin also visited Japan for a similar joint declaration.

In the following year, Japan passed a law that formally established the hinomaru and the kimigayo as Japan's national flag and anthem, respectively. Despite strong resistance from people who still had the dark memories of the war, Obuchi pushed ahead with the legislation.

All these might have been coincidences. To me, however, such a repeated pattern does not seem to be mere coincidences. Is there a delicate mechanism behind the reconciliation and nationalism?

Let's come back to late last year's agreement on comfort women. South Korea and Japan took a big step toward reconciliation on the long-lasting issue, as the Japanese government admitted its responsibility, offering the prime minister's apology, and deciding to donate one billion yen in state budget to the victims. Then, this year might be a time for nationalism.

Even if he does not know the "law of the following year," Abe knows very well the balance in walking a tightrope between the right-wing sentiment and realistic politics. Speaking of that, his statement in August 2015 marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II showed a mix of reconciliation and nationalistic sentiment.

Even so, a constitutional revision is a matter of extreme difficulty. The biggest focus is on Article 9, which bans Japan from possessing military forces. It seems that even Abe does not consider it something he can do quickly. He says he wants to start with areas where he can win consent. Still, he needs two-thirds approval from both the upper and lower houses of the Diet. As Abe's party has two thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, he thinks that the July elections for the House of Councillors are crucial.

Will that happen, however? Not long has passed since Abe invited the public backlash by forcefully passing a security law that changed the interpretation of Article 9. If he ignites public resentment again, his aiming will go awry. Which side will the Japanese public's sense of balance tip to? It is a great show this summer.

(Written by Yoshibumi Wakamiya, senior fellow of Japan Center for International Exchange and former chief editor of the Asahi Shimbun)

도쿄=서영아특파원 sya@donga.com